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THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL APPLICATION OF APPREHENSION
AND DETENTION LAWS: SECTION 236(C) OF THE
IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT
RIGOBERTO LEDESMA*
"It was an era before United States commitment to international
human rights; before enlightenment in and out of the United States
brought an end both to official racial discrimination at home and to
national-origins immigration law; before important freedoms were
recognized as preferred, inviting strict scrutiny if they were invaded
and requiring a compelling public interest to uphold their invasion.
Since that era, the Supreme Court . .. has left only immigration and
deportation outside the reach of fundamental constitutional
protections.
-Louis Henkin
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I. INTRODUCTION
Section 236(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) imposes
mandatory detention on some non-citizens currently in removal proceed-
ings and is triggered when immigration authorities deem a non-citizen
deportable or inadmissible under certain grounds.2 Individuals who fall
under this category may be detained for months, or even years, while
their immigration case is pending, despite the fact that they are not a
flight risk or do not otherwise pose a danger to the community. This
means "neither the immigration judge (IJ) nor the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) has the discretion to release the non-citizen" on bond.4
Even more prejudicial and constitutionally offensive is the precedent that
a non-citizen can be subject to mandatory detention without being
2. Section 236(c)(1) of the INA provides as follows:
The Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who (A) is inadmissible by
reason of having committed any offense in section 1182(a)(2) of this title, (B) is de-
portable by reason of having committed any offense covered in section
1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) of this title, (C) is deportable under section
1227(a)(2)(A)(i) on the basis of an offense for which the alien has been sentence to a
term of imprisonment of at least 1 year, or (D) is inadmissible under section
1182(a)(3)(B) of this title or deportable under section 1227(a)(4)(B) of this title, when
the alien is released, without regard to whether the alien is released on parole, super-
vised release, or probation, and without regard to whether the alien may be arrested
or imprisoned again for the same offense.
INA § 236(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1) (2012).
3. See Mark Noferi, Cascading Constitutional Deprivation: The Right to Appointed
Counsel for Mandatorily Detained Immigrants Pending Removal Proceedings, 18 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 63, 66 (2012) (explaining the varying lengths of time detainees might be held
for before adjudication).
4. Julie Dona, Making Sense of "Substantially Unlikely": An Empirical Analysis of the
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charged with a crime. As such, section 236(c) currently allows for the
unjust detention of non-citizens without sufficient due process of law.
6 In
turn, this detention comes with harsh consequences not only for the de-
tained non-citizen, but also for their families and communities.'
While the judicial and executive branches have recognized the need for
a comprehensive and pragmatic remedy to ameliorate this problem, they
have deferred to Congress's plenary power over immigration law.' In-
deed, Congress's plenary power-which allows for near absolute defer-
ence-continues to be the driving force behind immigration policies like
section 236(c), which places Congressional action largely outside the sys-
tem of checks and balances.' This enduring doctrine effectively treats
non-citizens with "whatever due process Congress deems appropriate[,]"
rather than affording them the due process protections determined by the
courts and the United States Constitution."o Further, this sweeping ple-
nary power doctrine gives Congress unqualified dominion to determine
who may enter its territory, to enlarge or decrease non-citizens' status,
and the right to strip non-citizens of status at will." In essence, plenary
power largely insulates immigration laws from constitutional attack, even
when such laws wrongfully treat non-citizens differently than citizens and
5. See, e.g., Matter of Kotliar, 24 I. & N. Dec. 124, 123, 126 (B.I.A. 2007) (holding
prosecution is not required to charge an immigrant under section 236(c) before they are
subject to mandatory detention).
6. See Alice E. Loughran, Congress, Categories, and the Constitution-Whether
Mandatory Detention of Criminal Aliens Violates Due Process, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 681,
681, 685 (2005) (illuminating the deficient procedural protections for detained immigrants
in the multi-layer review process of section 236(c)); see also Noferi, supra note 3, at 103
(discussing the ramifications of courts' oversight of procedural rights that should be af-
forded to immigrant detainees-especially the right to an attorney).
7. Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 42,
46 (2010).
8. See T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP PROCESS
AND POLICY 186 (West Academic Publishing 8th ed. 2016) (noting exceptional deference
given to Congress in matters concerning exclusion of non-citizens); cf Adam Liptak &
Michael D. Shear, Supreme Court Tie Blocks Obama Immigration Plan, N.Y. TIMES (June
23, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/24/us/supreme-court-immigration-obama-dapa
.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/Y9NJ-M4BE] (reporting on the Supreme Court ruling that
blocked President Obama's immigration plan).
9. See Noferi, supra note 3, at 97 (explaining the origin of the federal government's
plenary power to exclude and admit immigrants); see also Chae Chang Ping v. United
States, 130 U.S. 581, 608 (1889) (emphasizing the power to exclude is constantly exercised
as a "right of self-preservation").
10. Richard A. Boswell, Racism and U.S. Immigration Law: Prospects for Reform Af-
ter "9/11?", 7 J. GENDER, RACE, AND JUST. 315, 337-38 (2003).
11. Id. at 339.
3632017]1
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allege non-citizens do not have the same constitutional rights as
citizens.1 2
Courts at all levels should not see this as a lost battle, but rather as a
battle that has yet to be waged. The plenary power enabling section
236(c)'s mandatory detention is not an unconquerable obstacle; it has
only endured due to reformers' unwillingness to roll up their sleeves and
address such objectionable practices through political or judicial
processes.'3 Courts often dread overturning precedent, fearing that radi-
cal change will appear as a far-reaching power grab, but the reality is
mandatory detention under section 236(c) has eroded over time, and
courts are more willing to hear claims addressing its constitutionality.14
Several courts have found section 236(c) to be unconstitutional on its
face, noting that the mandatory detention provision could place non-citi-
zens in custody indefinitely-a clear violation of due process.'5 These
courts understand that blanket exemptions to constitutionality encom-
passed within immigration laws are a relic from a bygone era that must
undergo judicial review.16
The battle will not be easy, as courts will have to address unresolved
issues with previous holdings to correct this unconstitutional depriva-
tion.17  Notably, the Supreme Court in Demore v. Kim'8 upheld
mandatory detention of non-citizens who conceded their deportability
and were not eligible for relief from removal aside from "withholding of
removal."'9 Although Demore attempted to address an overlooked issue
it failed to resolve the constitutionality of section 236(c)'s mandatory de-
12. Adam B. Cox, Citizenship, Standing, and Immigration Law, 92 CAL. L. REv. 373,
377-78 (2004).
13. See David A. Martin, Why Immigration's Plenary Power Doctrine Endures, 68
OKLA L. REv. 29, 55 (2015) (declaring judicial timidity is an improper response to advocat-
ing for immigrant detainee's due process rights).
14. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 8.
15. Martinez v. Greene, 28 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1284 (D. Colo. 1998); Valerie Kato, Dis-
trict Court Holds Mandatory Detention Provisions of the INA Unconstitutional on its Face
and Requires Individualized Bond Hearings Under the IIRIRA'S Transition Custody Rules,
13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 319, 320-21 (1999).
16. See, e.g., Papazoglou v. Napolitano, No. 1:12-CV-00892, 2012 WL 1570778, at *5
(N.D. Ill. 2012) (holding an immigrant detainee's rights were violated due to excessive
mandatory detention); see also Henkin, supra note 1, at 862 ("Nothing in our Constitution,
its theory, or history warrants exempting any exercise of governmental power from consti-
tutional restraint.").
17. See Noferi, supra note 3, at 99 (comparing courts' interpretations of mandatory
detention provisions, as some found the provisions a violation of due process, while others
allowed justified mandatory detention under Congress's plenary power); Martin, supra
note 13, at 31 (criticizing the enduring deference allotted to the political branch).
18. 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
19. Id. at 531.
364 [Vol. 19:361
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tention of a non-citizen who has a good faith or substantial challenge to
removal, thereby illustrating how courts' interpretation of mandatory de-
tention continues to be a problem.20 Demore's blatant ambiguity and
failure to address the constitutional issue leaves courts with no real au-
tonomy and subjects non-citizens to mandatory detention under section
236(c) even when they qualify for relief.21 Consequently, mandatory de-
tention under section 236(c) continues to violate non-citizens' due pro-
cess rights under the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.22
Section 236(c) is an outdated and discriminatory immigration law that
has only recently been challenged and fails to consider that domestic dis-
crimination against persons is no longer permitted." The judiciary sys-
tem must step up and address the need for comprehensive change to halt
this constitutional deprivation.24 Despite the. deference given to Con-
gress, the judicial branch must ensure that immigration officials apply sec-
tion 236(c) reasonably, pragmatically, and constitutionally, and it must
take action when necessary.25
Part I of this Comment provides a brief overview of mandatory deten-
tion under section 236(c) and explains why it is such a significant and
crucial issue that is long overdue for judicial and congressional review on
procedural and constitutional grounds. This Part also illustrates the foun-
dational framework behind mandatory detention under section 236(c)
and describes how it clearly violates non-citizens' constitutional rights by
denying them due process. Part II clarifies the constitutional framework
of immigration law, describes Congress's immigration powers, and ex-
plains the origin of such powers. This Part delves into the origins of mod-
ern-day immigration laws by examining enumerated powers, inherent
powers, the plenary power doctrine, as well as the racism, nativism, and
20. See Gonzalez v. O'Connell, 355 F.3d 1010, 1119-20 (7th Cir. 2004) (claiming that
previous cases addressing mandatory detention "left open the question of whether
mandatory detention .. . is consistent with due process when a detainee makes a colorable
claim that he is not in fact deportable.").
21. M. Isabel Medina, Demore v. Kim-A Dance of Power and Human Rights, 18
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 697 (2005).
22. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law . . ."); see also Kato, supra note 15, at 322 (advocating
for an immigrant petitioners' due process rights).
23. See Medina, supra note 21, at 698 (warning that, if courts continue to ignore immi-
grants' recognized liberties, due process everywhere will be rendered meaningless).
24. See Boswell, supra note 10 (urging the judiciary to review Congress's autonomy
over immigration law).
25. See id. (claiming courts afford blanket deference to Congress under the plenary
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xenophobia2 6 that often serve as the basis for modern-day immigration
laws.
Part III focuses on the tumultuous history of mandatory detention
under 236(c) and examines how Congress originally intended it to func-
tion. This Part analyzes section 236(c)'s unconstitutionality by discussing
how mandatory detention deprives non-citizens of their procedural and
constitutional rights, particularly when they are not subject to mandatory
detention. Part IV raises key factors and identifies the hardships and bad
public policy behind section 236(c). Specifically, this Part examines past
court rulings involving section 236(c), such as Jennings v. Rodriguez,27
which was granted certiorari by the Supreme Court on June 20, 2016. It
also describes how mandatory detention fails to meet its intended pur-
pose and perpetuates bad policies that affect the lives of both citizens and
non-citizens.
Part V presents pragmatic solutions that courts, including the Supreme
Court in Jennings v. Rodriguez and future courts, should seriously con-
sider when addressing mandatory detention, to address the failings of sec-
tion 236(c). This Part proactively addresses feasible solutions that ensure
the government is held accountable and non-citizens are not deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process.
II. A HISTORY OF U.S. IMMIGRATION LAWS
"In order to understand where we are now and where we are going,
we must first understand where we have been."28
-Professor Jennifer Cunningham
To better understand the problems with section 236(c), some historical
grounding into immigration law is necessary. To begin, Congress has au-
thority to regulate which non-citizens may enter the United States, under
what conditions they may remain, and who may be excluded.29 Most be-
lieve the Framers of the Constitution endowed Congress with such power,
but the U.S. Constitution does not expressly grant Congress such author-
26. Xenophobia is defined as a "fear and hatred of strangers or foreigners or of any-
thing that is strange or foreign." Xenophobia, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/xenophobia?utm-campaign=sd&utm-medium=serp&utm-source=
jsonld [https://perma.cc/KGC6-7R2C] (last visited May 5, 2017).
27. No. 15-1204, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (U.S. June 20, 2016) (mem.).
28. Jennifer Cunningham, Why Does History Matter?, HISTORY RULES, http://www
.historyrules.com [https://perma.cc/7ZZ4-REN4] (last visited Mar. 27, 2017).
29. See Cox, supra note 12, at 375 (noting the power to regulate immigration derives
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ity.3o Indeed, Congress did not enact significant immigration legislation
until the 1880s because, prior to this time, Congress allowed an open bor-
der doctrine to provide the developing nation with labor and capital.
31
The earliest statutes limiting immigration were enacted in 1875 and
1882 to "prohibit the entry of criminals, prostitutes, idiots, lunatics, and
persons likely to become a public charge."3 2 These early immigration
statutes were crude, but arguably justified for a then-developing nation
such as the United States.3 3 The statutes quickly became even more ra-
cially charged and discriminatory: for example, the 1882 Chinese Exclu-
sion Act3 4 was largely fueled by anti-Chinese fervor that swept the nation
and influenced national politics at the time." These types of xenophobic
immigration laws laid the foundation for current discriminatory immigra-
tion laws in the United States.36
A. Sources of Federal Immigration Power
The United States continues to exercise immigration power under the
justification that Congress's enumerated, inherent, and plenary powers
give it the right to act unilaterally with regard to immigration matters.
For instance, the Commerce Clause of the Constitution authorizes Con-
gress "to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among several
states."38 Though textually limited and vague, Congress argued this gave
them power to regulate immigration.3 9 Later, the Supreme Court ad-
hered to this notion:
30. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 8 (emphasizing how many scholars' suggest the
plenary power doctrine does not exist); Noferi, supra note 3, at 97 (tracing back to the
Court's creation of the plenary power doctrine to 1889).
31. See Peter J. Duignan, Making and Remaking America: Immigration into the United
States, HOOVER INST. (Sept. 15, 2003), http://www.hoover.org/research/making-and-remak-
ing-america-immigration-united-states [https://perma.cc/22CH-RD73] (noting the United
States had a laissez-faire, or open borders, policy until the late ninetieth century).
32. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 8, at 152.
33. See Frosty Wooldridge, Ten Reasons for Enforcing American Immigration Law,
RENSE.COM (Feb. 9, 2005), http://www.rense.com/general62/immg.htm [https://perma.cc/
5NRU-YE7E] (setting out several important rationales behind previous immigration laws).
34. Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882) (repealed 1943).
35. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 8, at 153; see also Boswell, supra note 10, at 338
(illustrating the racism and xenophobia behind immigration statutes).
36. See Boswell, supra note 10, at 338-39 (contending xenophobic fears continued to
be pervasive throughout the twentieth century).
37. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 8; see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316,
316, 356 (1819) (recognizing Congress's power to regulate immigration).
38. U.S. CONsT. art 1, § 8.
39. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 8, at 179 (examining Congress's implied power
to regulate "immigration as a part of commerce of this country with foreign nations").
2017] 367
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The power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty
belonging to the government of the United States as a part of those
sovereign powers delegated by the constitution, the right to its exer-
cise at any time when, in the judgment of the government, the inter-
ests of the country require it, cannot be granted away or restrained
on behalf of any one.40
This archaic notion that the country has a right to self-preservation and
self-definition came at a time when racial discrimination was the accepted
norm.41 These views are clearly obsolete and in need of readjustment to
fit modern society, where discrimination is no longer the acceptable social
convention.4 2
i. Plenary Powers: The Enduring Doctrine
Xenophobic and discriminatory views gave rise to the plenary power
doctrine, which allows for absolute deference to Congress on matters of
immigration.43 To justify their plenary power over immigration law fur-
ther, Congress links immigration policies to their powers over foreign af-
fairs.44 Despite this argument, "the foreign affairs power receives no
explicit mention in the Constitution"45 and is used merely to serve the
"country's official racial policies."46 This effectively places no limits on
Congress, leaving immigration outside the reach of essential constitu-
tional safeguards.47 Even so, scholars contend that "[Congress's] plenary
power is subject to constitutional restrains" that must be enforced to en-
sure "all persons" are afforded the fundamental protections guaranteed
to them under the U.S. Constitution.4 8 Nevertheless, because the Court
has affirmed the strong nexus between "immigration control and foreign
affair powers[,]" the plenary power doctrine has endured.49
40. Chae Chang Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889).
41. See Warren J. Blumenfeld, Immigration Laws as Official 'Racial' Policy, HUF-
FINGTON POST (July 19, 2014, 11:00 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/warren-j-blumen
feld/immigration-laws-as-offic_b_5601240.html [https://perma.cc/6PEB-WD52] (discussing
the emergence of xenophobic immigration laws).
42. Cf id. (claiming the U.S. immigration system is "severely broken and needs
fixing").
43. Martin, supra note 13, at 55.
44. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 8, at 181-82.
45. Id. at 181.
46. Blumenfeld, supra note 41.
47. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 8, at 187.
48. Henkin, supra note 1, at 863; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall ...
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ... ") (emphasis added);
Martin, supra note 13, at 29-38 (critiquing the Supreme Court's justifications for the ple-
nary power doctrine).
49. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 8, at 188.
368 [Vol. 19:361
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B. Racism, Nativism, and Xenophobia Make up the Foundational
Framework of Immigration Power
Congress's immigration power is founded in part upon racially driven
immigration cases that reached the courts in the same decade as Plessy v.
Ferguson."o One such case is 1889's Chae Chan Ping v. United States,"
which granted Congress the complete authority to govern immigration
through enacting legislation.52 Four years later, the Supreme Court was
faced with yet another case, Fong Yue Ting v. United States," where the
Court reiterated that Congress has the right to expel or deport foreign-
ers.5 4 The statute at issue in Fong was directed at "obnoxious Chinese ...
[as a] distasteful class," again underscoring the racist origins of certain
immigration laws."5 However, not all courts turned a blind eye to the
constitutional deprivations of non-citizens: in Wong Wing v. United
States,56 for example, the Court invalidated a federal immigration statute,
holding that the Bill of Rights extended to all persons, including non-
citizens, who fall under the protections of the Constitution." The Wong
Wing court further held that all persons within the territory of the United
States are entitled to protections guaranteed by the Constitution and can-
not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process." This
early precedent thus demonstrates the Supreme Court's awareness of
problems associated with depriving non-citizens of constitutional rights.5 9
This brief historic overview of immigration law ensures understanding the
origin and purpose of mandatory detention under section 236(c), and why
it is in desperate need of reform.
50. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 549 (1896) (upholding racial segregation laws
for public facilities under the doctrine of "separate but equal").
51. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
52. Id. at 604.
53. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
54. Id. at 707.
55. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 743 (1893) (Brewer, J.,
dissenting) (illustrating the racist origin of the statute at issue in the case).
56. 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
57. Id. at 238.
58. Id.
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III. SECTION 236(c): MANDATORY DETENTION AND
ITS STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
Prior to the passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA),6 0 which made sweeping modifications to
immigration laws, mandatory detention was not as rampant as it is to-
day.61 IIRIRA amended section 236(c) to include mandatory detention
of certain non-citizens in removal proceedings6 2 and eliminated key de-
fenses to removal and detention for Legal Permanent Residents
(LPRs) .63 The elimination of key defenses increased the number of non-
citizens with criminal convictions, which resulted in their mandatory de-
tention even for relatively minor, nonviolent crimes.6 4
Congress originally began discussing the IIRIRA to amend immigra-
tion laws they perceived as too relaxed.65 Despite mounting concerns
from members of the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives,
Congress ultimately adopted the proposed IIRIRA modifications and re-
quired the detention of certain non-citizens pending removal proceed-
ings.66 As a result, the 1996 IIRIRA modifications gave life to section
236(c) in its current form, which empowers the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) to detain any non-citizen it deems deportable or inadmis-
sible for committing certain crimes as soon as removal proceedings be-
67gin. Further, neither the IJ nor the BIA have authority to release the
60. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA),
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996).
61. See INA § 236(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2012) (enforcing mandatory detention for
non-citizens found inadmissible due to health, criminal conduct, having multiple convic-
tions, and security concerns and rendering deportable those convicted of crimes involving
moral turpitude, having multiple convictions, committing aggravated felonies, possessing
controlled substances, committing certain firearms offenses, or being involved in terrorist
activities).
62. See Medina, supra note 21, at 698 (objecting to the manner in which section 236(c)
punishes non-citizens).
63. See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110
Stat. 3009 (1996) (pointing out that section 236(c) mandatory detention was a part of the
IIRIRA).
64. Medina, supra note 21, at 698.
65. See, e.g., Testimony of Barbara Jordan, Chair, U.S. Commission on Immigration
Reform Before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee
on Immigration and Claims, TEXASBORDERVOLUNTEERS.ORG (Feb. 24, 1995), http://www
.texasbordervolunteers.org/userfiles/Microsoft%20Word%20-%2OTestimony%20of%20
Barbara%20Jordan(1).pdf [https://perma.cclN935-BCZW] (emphasizing the top priority to
deportation is to remove criminal aliens people are punished in order to give credibility to
immigration laws).
66. See S. REP. No. 104-48 (1995) (claiming that the Senate believes abuse of power
and lengthy detainment are among with problems with mandatory detention).
67. INA § 236(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2012).
370 [Vol. 19:361
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non-citizen on bond, even if the DHS does not consider them a flight risk
or a danger to the community.68 Due to the complexity of removal pro-
ceedings and the federal government's limited resources, an apprehended
non-citizen could be detained for months, or even years, while they await
resolution of their case.6 9
A. How Section 236(c) Mandatory Detention Was Intended to Work
Congress promulgated section 236(c) due to concerns that non-citizens
with criminal records presented a substantial threat to their constituents'
communities.70 The goal was to subject such non-citizens to mandatory
detention and, eventually, removal."
At first glance, section 236(c) may appear practical and rational; how-
ever, further examination reveals the overbroad manner in which the
statute triggers mandatory detention.7 2 If committed by U.S. citizens, the
acts listed in section 236(c) would typically amount to nothing more than
petty offenses, but non-citizens who commit the same acts face a much
harsher and disproportionate punishment." At this juncture, further ex-
amination is needed to understand fully how the 1996 IIRIRA modifica-
68. See id. § 236(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (giving the Attorney General sole discretion to
unilaterally revoke a bond).
69. See Bradley B. Banias, A "Substantial Argument" Against Prolonged, Pre-Re-
moval Mandatory Detention, 11 RUTGERS RACE & L. REv. 31, 31 (2009) (alluding to
lengthy detainment periods that raise constitutional concerns).
70. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 697 (2001). The language of section 236(c) states
that DHS, through powers delegated by the Attorney General, may detain any non-citizen
who meets the following:
(a) is inadmissible by reason of having committed any offense covered in section
212(a)(2) [8 USCS § 1182(a)(2)] [committed any crime involving moral turpitude or a
controlled substance offense];
(b) is deportable by reason of having committed any offense covered in section
237(a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) [8 USCS § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B),
(C), or (D)] [having committed a crime involving moral turpitude, an aggravated of-
fense, a controlled substance offense, a firearms offense, or another specified offense];
(c) is deportable under section 237(a)(2)(A)(i) [8 USCS § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)] on the
basis of an offense for which the alien has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment
of at least 1 year [having committed a CIMT for which the non-citizen was sentenced
to a term of imprisonment of at least one year]; or
(d) is inadmissible under section 212(a)(3)(B) [8 USCS § 1182(a)(3)(B)] or deport-
able under section 237(a)(4)(B) [8 USCS § 1227(a)(4)(B)] [for engaging in terrorist
activities].
INA § 236(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2012).
71. Davis, 533 U.S. at 697.
72. See Medina, supra note 21 (critiquing the wide latitude the executive and legisla-
tive branches have regarding immigration matters).
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tions dramatically increased the number of crimes triggering mandatory
detention, including minor and nonviolent crimes, convictions for crimes
involving moral turpitude (CIMT), and possession of controlled
substances.7 4
B. Constitutional Challenges to Section 236(c)
Despite Congressional intent to target non-citizens who potentially
posed a danger to the public or were seen as a flight risk, 5 section 236(c)
deprived non-citizens who did not fall under either category of their con-
stitutional right to due process.76 No story better depicts the manner in
which a petty offense can render a non-citizen subject to mandatory de-
tention than that of Joao Herbert, a non-citizen adopted by an Ohio fam-
ily from Brazil at the age of eight who quickly assimilated into American
culture.
Joao lived a traditional American life and graduated high school."
Just two months after graduation, Joao pleaded guilty to attempting to
sell marijuana and was sentenced to probation.7 9 Joao was a first-time
offender and served no jail time for the offense, but was classified as an
"aggravated felon," which triggered section 236(c).so Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) consequently detained him for twenty
months." This case is particularly troubling because a typical U.S. teen-
ager under the same circumstances would have had the opportunity to
see the incident as a wake-up call and turn their life around.8 2 Joao did
not have this opportunity; instead, he faced a much harsher consequence,
74. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2017); see also id. § 1227(a)(2)(B) (2008) (holding non-
citizens convicted of controlled substances crimes are deportable, unless convicted of a
single offense involving possession for personal use of thirty grams or less of marijuana);
Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I & N Dec. 687, 709 (A.G. 2008) (stating that an inquiry regard-
ing moral turpitude is not overly burdensome in sexual abuse cases).
75. Davis, 533 U.S. at 682 (referring to a special statute that authorizes further deten-
tion if the government does not remove a non-citizen within ninety days).
76. See Kato, supra note 15, at 319 (reporting on the unconstitutionality of mandatory
detention and arguing for individualized bond hearings).
77. Susan Levine, A Foreigner at Home: For Children Adopted From Abroad, Law-
breaking Brings Deportation, WASH. PosT (Mar. 5, 2000), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-srv/WPcap/2000-03/05/080r-030500-idx.html [https://perma.cc/ZE6Y-VBNF].
78. Id.
79. Id.; Joao Herbert, POUND Pup LEGACY, http://poundpuplegacy.org/node/17356
[https://perma.cc/LW3A-BG2P] (last visited Mar. 13, 2017) [hereinafter, Joao Herbert].
80. Ellis M. Johnston, Once a Criminal, Always a Criminal? Unconstitutional Pre-
sumptions for Mandatory Detention of Criminal Aliens, 89 GEO. L.J. 2593-94 (2001); Joao
Herbert, supra note 79.
81. Johnston, supra note 80; Joao Herbert, supra note 79.
82. Johnston, supra note 80, at 2594; see also Joao Herbert, supra note 79 (discussing
the life of Joao Herbert in the United States and his deportation to Brazil).
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as he was subjected to mandatory detention for the entirety of his re-
moval proceedings. Although Joao was an LPR, he was subjected to a
lower standard of scrutiny under the Due Process Clause than typically
afforded to U.S. citizens.8 4 Moreover, Congress has plenary power to af-
ford a non-citizen such as Joao whatever due process it deems appropri-
ate, when Joao but when he attempted to exert one of the most
fundamental human liberties, the right to physical freedom, they never-
theless deprived him of his constitutional right to due process.
Congress justified section 236(c)'s constitutionality on the grounds that
"criminal aliens are a serious and growing threat to the public safety."8 6
In so doing, Congress ignored the fact that many crimes listed in this sec-
tion are nothing more than petty offenses, which expose non-citizens to
disproportionate punishment." Additionally, Congress also ignored the
manner in which the section 236(c) subjects non-citizens to unnecessary
detention when they should be afforded the same right to fight their re-
moval proceedings as non-detainees.
Congress further justified mandatory detention on the grounds that
"over 20 percent of non[-]detained criminal aliens fail to appear at their
removal proceedings."89 Even if this number is accurate, Congress evi-
dently disregarded the fact that eighty percent of non-detained non-citi-
zens did appear at their removal proceedings.90 Congress also failed to
consider that many non-citizens subjected to mandatory detention were
eligible for immigration relief that would ultimately excuse the conduct
that initially made them subject to 236(c).91
The very idea that a non-citizen may be subjected to mandatory deten-
tion without due process of the law is troubling and cannot be tolerated.
There are a number of possible constitutional challenges against section
236(c), but each is limited and riddled with complications of its own.92
83. Johnston, supra note 80, at 2594; Joao Herbert, supra note 79.
84. Medina, supra note 21.
85. Id.; Levine, supra note 77.
86. S. REP. No. 104-48 (1995); Johnston, supra note 80, at 2596-97.
87. See Johnston, supra note 80, at 2598 (indicating immigration authorities have ap-
plied section 236(c) in an overbroad manner and thereby enlarged the definition of "aggra-
vated felony" to include non-violent crimes).
88. Id.
89. S. REP. No. 104-48 (1995); Johnston, supra note 80, at 2597.
90. Johnston, supra note 80, at 2597 (emphasis in original).
91. See id. at 2596 (noting all immigrants with criminal convictions are subject to de-
portation proceedings regardless of their status).
92. See e.g., Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1090 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted
sub norn. Jennings v. Rodriguez, No. 15-1204, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (U.S. June 20, 2016) (holding
that non-citizens that remained in custody for six months were entitled to automatic bond
hearings "to justify their continued detention"); Casas-Castrillon v. Dep't of Homeland
2017] 373
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The prevailing challenge against mandatory detention is Rodriguez v.
Robbins,9 3 a Ninth Circuit case stating that immigration authorities
should make a bond available to detained non-citizens after six months of
detention.94 While Rodriguez struck down section 236(c), mandatory de-
tention remains problematic because the court decided this case under
the constitutional avoidance doctrine, thereby circumventing the consti-
tutional question of due process.95 Under the constitutional avoidance
doctrine, courts decide issues on non-constitutional grounds and only
base rulings on the Constitution as a last resort.96 Further, the Rodriguez
ruling remains tentative given that the U.S. Supreme Court recently
granted certiorari to rule on the constitutional issue.9 7
In light of the due process issue, the BIA limited mandatory detention
in the 1999 case Matter of Joseph,98 and created a two-step release pro-
cess for those detained under section 236(c).99 First, the non-citizen is
entitled to a bond hearing if they can show the government is "substan-
tially unlikely to prevail" on the charge of deportability or inadmissibility
originally triggering the mandatory detention.10 0 Second, the IJ must
hold a bond hearing to determine whether the non-citizen should be re-
leased pursuant to the factors used in a traditional bond hearing.10 1 Mat-
ter of Joseph is thus extremely limited. It only allows a non-citizen the
Sec., 535 F.3d 942, 946-52 (9th Cir. 2008) (allowing non-citizens to challenge removal pro-
ceedings through writ of habeas corpus if they are detained for prolonged periods after the
case is decided); Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, 767 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1060 (C.D. Cal. 2010)
(finding non-citizens face persecution because of mental disabilities and could be deported
without an opportunity to litigate, which increases the likelihood of irreparable harm);
Papazoglou v. Napolitano, No. 1:12-CV-00892, 2012 WL 1570778, at *5-6 (N.D. Ill. 2012)
(finding that a mandatory detention of over a year, when an IJ has already determined
non-citizen should be released, is a due process violation); Matter of Joseph, 22 I. & N.
Dec. 799 (B.I.A. 1999) (placing discretionary power in the IJ to determine whether an alien
is within the statutory provisions that would deprive the noncitizen the condition posed on
them by the INS).
93. 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. Jennings v. Rodriguez, No.
15-1204, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (U.S. June 20, 2016)
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1074.
96. See id. at 1082-83 ("[W]here one possible application of a statue raises constitu-
tional concerns, the statute as a whole should be construed through prism of constitutional
avoidance").
97. Jennings v. Rodriguez, No. 15-1204, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (U.S. June 20, 2016) (mem.).
98. 22 I. & N. Dec. 799 (B.I.A. 1999).
99. See id. (explaining that immigration officials will not consider an LPR properly
included in a mandatory detention category if it is unlikely that the INS will prevail on a
removability charge).
100. Id. at 807.
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possibility of bond if they can meet an extremely high burden.1 02 It does
not entitle non-citizens to automatic release pending an immigration mer-
its hearing because only the IJ has authority to make this decision.1 0 3
Evidently, while the BIA recognized the constitutional due process
concerns associated with section 236(c), it did not go far enough in afford-
ing non-citizens sufficient protection.'04 Matter of Joseph essentially cre-
ated a trial within a trial because the non-citizen has to present nearly the
same amount of evidence to be entitled to the bond hearing as they
would normally present during their merits hearing.'0 A third possible
challenge to mandatory detention is the application of Papazoglou v. Na-
politano,0 6 wherein the court held that, even if deportability or inadmis-
sibility would normally trigger detention under section 236(c), mandatory
detention is inapplicable if the non-citizen has a "substantial claim" to
relief from removal.'0 7 Substantial claims to relief include section 212(c)
of the INA,' cancellation of deportation,109 adjustment,1 o and asy-
lum."' However, Papazoglou only applies to non-citizens represented
by counsel and who are eligible to adjust their status.112 Non-citizens
without counsel or ineligible to adjust their status are left without a feasi-
ble challenge to mandatory detention."3 Papazoglou also places a huge
102. See id. (claiming the court's holding does not dictate the role of the IJ or BIA
and only applies when an "alien in custody actually falls within a category of aliens subject
to mandatory detention") (emphasis added).
103. Id. at 807.
104. See Dona, supra note 4, at 94 (suggesting the Joseph standard is not sound public
policy because it locks the government into paying for the detention of many stable, non-
dangerous LPRs who should instead be reunited with their families in the United States).
105. See generally Farrin R. Anello, Due Process and Temporal Limits on Mandatory
Immigration Detention, 65 HASTINGs L.J. 363 (2014) (explaining mandatory detention and
bond hearings).
106. No. 1:12-CV-00892, 2012 WL 1570778 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
107. See id. at *5 (holding that subjecting Papazoglou to mandatory detention without
the opportunity of a bond hearing or date set for pending appeals is a due process
violation).
108. INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (2012).
109. Id. § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b); see also Margaret H. Taylor, What Happened to
Non-LPR Cancellation? Rationalizing Immigration Enforcement by Restoring Durable Re-
lief from Removal, 30 J.L. & POL. 527, 530 (2015) (discussing cancellation of removal as a
discretionary form of relief).
110. INA § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2012).
111. Id. § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158.
112. See Papazoglou v. Napolitano, No. 1:12-CV-00892, 2012 WL 1570778, at *3 (N.D.
Ill. 2012) (limiting the holding to those who demonstrate INS is substantially unlikely to
determine the person may be mandatorily detained).
113. See, e.g., Guerra v. Shanahan, 831 F.3d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 2016) (stating 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a) allows mandatory detention pending a decision of an adjustment in status);
375
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burden on non-citizens seeking relief because proving a "substantial
claim" requires the equivalent of trying a full hearing on the merits.114
Another potential challenge to mandatory detention, is provided in
Casas-Castrillon v. DHS,"' a Ninth Circuit case stating that a bond hear-
ing is available when the Ninth Circuit grants review of a BIA order of
removal.1 16 Obviously, utilizing this holding is problematic because it ex-
plicitly only applies on appeal to the Ninth Circuit, at which point the
non-citizen will likely have been detained for years.1 17 Further, Casas-
Castrillon is not binding outside the Ninth Circuit.11s Lastly, one can
challenge mandatory detention on the grounds laid out in Franco-Gonza-
lez v Holder,11 9 which held bond hearings and appointment of counsel
must be made available for non-citizens with mental disabilities.120 Once
again, this ruling is limited in that it only helps non-citizens with mental
disabilities, and if such persons are not represented by legal counsel, they
have no one to raise the issue to the IJ.' 2 1 Most importantly, this case
ignores the constitutional question of mandatory detention and focuses
on mental illness.12 2
The "categorical approach" is another tool advocates can use to chal-
lenge mandatory detention.12 3 1s, the BIA, and federal courts generally
employ the categorical approach to decide whether a certain criminal
conviction triggers removal.12 4 To make this determination, the fact
finder reviews the elements of the conviction statute rather than the con-
duct underlying the conviction.125 If the conviction statute defines more
than one crime, and at least one of those crimes triggers a ground of re-
moval, then the categorical approach can be "modified." 1 26 Under these
circumstances, the fact finder may look into the "record of conviction-a
Papazoglou, 2012 WL 1570778, at *5 (implying that if Papazoglou was left without the
ability to adjust his immigrations status, he would have remained indefinitely detained).
114. Papazoglou, 2012 WL 1570778, at *3.




119. 767 F. Supp. 2d 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1061.
122. Id. at 1034.
123. See generally Sejal Zota, Matter of Davey & the Categorical Approach, NAT'L
IMMIGR. PROJEcr 1 (Jan. 15, 2013), https://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/PDFs/
practitioners/practice-advisories/crim/2013_15Jan -davey-categor-apprch.pdf [https://perma
.cc/TSP2-VHHA] (describing the categorical approach).
124. Id.
125. Id.
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defined set of court documents including the charging document, plea
agreement, plea colloquy transcript, and verdict or judgment of convic-
tion-to determine whether the defendant was necessarily convicted of
an offense falling within the removal ground."1 2 7 However, while the cat-
egorical approach sounds great in theory, its actual application does not
resolve mandatory detention under section 236(c).12 8
It seems challenges against mandatory detention are abundant, but
each promising argument is restricted in application and teeming with
technical hitches.12 9 To be sure, each case has come close to challenging
the constitutionality of section 236(c), but the decisions never addressed
the problem at its core.13 0 Despite these rulings and subsequent regula-
tions promulgated by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS),
there is little guidance as to how the determinations of mandatory deten-
tion should officially be made."1 In today's immigration system, ICE
may make an initial determination of whether an individual is subject to
mandatory detention, and the IJ can review such determination through a
Joseph hearing.13 2 Yet, many non-citizens are subjected to mandatory de-
tention under section 236(c) without an individualized hearing, and even
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., Matter of Davey, 26 I. & N. Dec. 37, 37 (B.I.A. 2012) (refusing to apply
the categorical approach to the INA's exception to individuals who would normally be
subject to deportation for being convicted of possession of a controlled substance).
129. See Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1060 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub
nom. Jennings v. Rodriguez, No. 15-1204, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (U.S. June 20, 2016) (mem.)
(holding individuals who are inadmissible or deportable for having committing certain of-
fenses are entitled to individualized bond hearings wherein their continued detention must
be justified); Casas-Castrillon v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 535 F.3d 942, 944 (9th Cir. 2008)
(requiring procedural safeguards accompany prolonged detentions, such as a hearing to
determine whether the release of an individual would pose a flight risk or danger to the
community); Papazoglou v. Napolitano, No. 1:12-CV-00892, 2012 WL 1570778, at * 5 (N.D.
Ill. 2012) (finding a due process violation, in part, when an individual was mandatorily
detained, despite the fact he demonstrated a "substantial likelihood" of remaining in the
United States); Franco-Gonzales v. Holder, 767 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1046 (C.D. Cal. 2010)
(reasoning plaintiff's mental incompetence would lead them to be irreparably harmed if
unable to participate in their immigration proceedings meaningfully); Matter of Joseph, 22
I. & N. Dec. 799, 800 (B.I.A. 1999) (granting an IJ the right to determine whether an LPR
is "not properly" included in a category of mandatory detention). The Joseph decision is
limited by requiring IJ to have "very substantial grounds" for such determination when the
issue is addressed prior to the completion of the case-in-chief. Id.
130. E.g., Casas-Castrillon, 535 F.3d at 944-45.
131. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h) (2006) (providing general, yet vague guidelines on cus-
tody hearings for detention).
132. CHALLENGING DETENTION WITHOUT A BOND HEARING PENDING REMOVAL
PROCEEDINGS 2, 5, AM. Civ. LIBERTIES UNION (Feb. 2015), https://www.aclu.org/files/
assets/ACLU%20detention%20without%20bond%20hearing%20February%202015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ARM5-WSSG] [hereinafter CHALLENGING DETENTION].
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when a challenge can be raised, it will only be after prolonged
detention.13 3
IV. RODRIGUEZ v. ROBBINS: CHALLENGING THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY, REASONING, AND PUBLIC POLICY
BEHIND SECTION 236(c)
Rodriguez v. Robbins, addressed the constitutional concerns arising
from section 236(c).13 4 In Rodriguez, a class action consisting of six indi-
viduals challenged their prolonged detention without an individualized
bond hearing and sought determinations to justify their continued deten-
tion.13 ' The district court entered a summary judgment and a permanent
injunction in their favor.13 6 The permanent injunction required the gov-
ernment to provide non-citizens, subject to prolonged detention of six
months or more, with a bond hearing before an IJ.137 The district court
further held the "government must prove by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the detainee is [either] a flight risk or a danger to the commu-
nity to justify the denial of bond."13 8
The government appealed the district court's decision, arguing the
court erred in applying the constitutional avoidance doctrine.13 9 The pe-
titioners cross-appealed, claiming IJs have unfettered discretion in a nor-
mal bond hearing to consider the likelihood of removal and the amount
of time the non-citizen has been detained.14 0 Consequently, on appeal
the Ninth Circuit delved into mandatory detention's nature, legality, and
hardships.14 '
133. See Rodriguez v. Shanahan, 84 F. Supp. 3d 251, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) ("[The INA]
carves out an exception to section 236(a)'s general immigration detention and provides for
the mandatory detention, without an individualized bond hearing, of a narrow category of
criminal non-citizens") (emphasis added); CHALLENGING DETENTION, supra note 132, at
6-7 (advising detainees and attorneys to request a Joseph hearing if detention becomes
prolonged.
134. Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. Jen-
nings v. Rodriguez, No. 15-1204, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (U.S. June 20, 2016) (mem.). This is the
predecessor case of Jennings v. Rodriguez, which was granted certiorari by the Supreme
Court. Jennings v. Rodriguez, No. 15-1204, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (U.S. June 20, 2016) (mem.).
135. The names of the six individuals are as follows: (1) Alejandro Rodriguez, (2)
Abdirizak Aden Farah, (3) Jose Farias Cornejo, (4) Yussuf Abdikadir, (5) Abel Perez Rue-
las, and (6) Efren Orozco. Rodriguez, 804 F.3d at 1065; ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 8,
at 1016.
136. Rodriguez, 804 F.3d at 1065.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1071.
140. Id. at 1072.
141. Id. at 1071-72.
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The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by examining the duration of
mandatory detention the six petitioners endured, which ranged from 404
days to 1,585 days (nearly four-and-a-half years).
1 42 Interestingly, deten-
tion periods vary depending on whether a non-citizen elects to fight their
case or concede removability.1 43  Many non-citizens subjected to
mandatory detention elect to surrender their meritorious claims and sign
their own voluntary departure.1 44 Despite having a meritorious claim,
many non-citizens refuse to endure years of immigration detention in ex-
change for immigration relief, even when they could prevail.
14
5
For example, immigration officials first placed Alejandro Rodriguez,
who was an LPR, in removal proceedings in 2004 and subjected him to
mandatory detention when his previous conviction of "joyriding" was
classified as an "aggravated offense," thereby triggering section 236(c).
146
However, Alejandro did not give up and pursued his case for immigration
relief to the U.S. Supreme Court.1 47 As a result, Alejandro was detained
for 1,189 days (over three years) until he was finally released from immi-
gration detention in 2007.148
A related case, Penuliar v. Mukasey,149 held that unlawful driving or
taking of a vehicle did not qualify as a theft offense under the categorical
approach and thus was not an aggravated felony.
5 o Utilizing the holding
in Penuliar, Alejandro once again petitioned his case to the BIA.
1 51 This
time, the BIA agreed with the Penuliar court that joyriding was not an
aggravated felony, granted Alejandro's application for cancellation of re-
moval, and reinstated his LPR status.152 This would be a happier ending
if Alejandro had not been deprived of his liberty for over three years
142. Id. at 1072.
143. Id.; see also Faiza W. Sayed, Note, Challenging Detention: Why Immigrant De-
tainees Receive Less Process Than "Enemy Combatants" and Why They Deserve More, 111
COLUM. L. REv. 1833, 1833 (2011) (discussing the process a non-citizen must undergo to
challenge mandatory detention and suggesting avenues to reform immigrant challenges to
mandatory detention).
144. Cf Noferi, supra note 3, at 80 (emphasizing how the effects of prolonged deten-
tion, such as mental and physical anguish, can affect one's ability to "meaningfully
litigate").
145. See Sayed, supra note 143 (illustrating how, even when victorious, one detainee
had to endure four years of detention before finally proving he was not deportable).
146. Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1073 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom.
Jennings v. Rodriguez, No. 15-1204, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (U.S. June 20, 2016) (mem.).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. 528 F.3d 603 (9th Cir. 2008).
150. Id. at 614.
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while detained pursuant to section 236(c).'5 Ultimately, after analyzing
each of the six petitioner's cases, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision requiring automatic periodic bond hearings and man-
dated that Us provide periodic bond hearings at six-month intervals.154
The court, however, refused to require the additional procedural safe-
guards petitioners requested in their cross-appeal."'
A. The Hardships of Civil Detention
In nearly every context aside from immigration law, courts have ruled
the Constitution requires due process prior to detention-that is, when
the government seeks to deprive an individual of their right to move
freely-to ensure an individual's constitutional rights are protected.15 6
Such a lack of due process in the immigration context even led the Rodri-
guez court to note that "[e]arly cases upholding immigration detention
policies were a product of their time.""' Initially, much of the founda-
tional immigration power came from Chae Chan Pingss and Fong Yue
Ting,159 both of which left immigration matters completely up to Con-
gress under its plenary power over immigration matters.'60 Indeed, Con-
gress's plenary power effectively "treats immigrants arriving in the
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1074.
155. Id.
156. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) ("The Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause forbids the Government to 'depriv[e] any person .. . of ... liberty ...
without due process of law. Freedom from imprisonment-from government custody, de-
tention, or other forms of physical restraint-lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause
protects.") (internal quotations omitted); Kato, supra note 15, at 320 (discussing a case in
which a government infringement pursuant to section 236(c) survived a due process chal-
lenge because deportation is regulatory in nature rather than a punishment).
157. Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1076 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom.
Jennings v. Rodriguez, No. 15-1204, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (U.S. June 20, 2016) (mem.). The
court continues by citing to cases involving Chinese exclusion legislation, McCarthyism
contributing to deporting communists, and removal of German immigrants during WWII.
Id.
158. See Chae Chang Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889) ("That the gov-
ernment of the United States, through the action of the legislative department, can exclude
aliens from its territory is a proposition which we do not think open to controversy.").
159. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893).
160. See id. (affirming the "absolute and unqualified" right of United States to deport
non-citizens from the country); Chae Chang Ping, 130 U.S. at 603 ("That the government
of the United States, through the action of the legislative department, can exclude aliens
from its territory is a proposition which we do not think open to controversy."); see also
Frances M. Kreimer, Dangerousness on the Loose: Constitutional Limits to Immigration
Detention as Domestic Crime Control, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1485, 1492 (2012) (discussing
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United States with whatever due process Congress deems
appropriate."'6 1
Yet, in Wong Wing v. United States, the Supreme Court stated that "all
persons within the territory of the United States[,]" including non-citi-
zens, are entitled to the protections guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments, and therefore could not "be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process."1 6 2 In fact, many non-citizens who are
mandatorily detained view detention as a "deprivation as serious as re-
moval itself."'6 3
Three critical examples illustrate how non-citizens must overcome
nearly insurmountable challenges while in ICE custody. First, how immi-
gration officials treat detainees is nearly indistinguishable from how
criminals serving time in prison are treated.164 Detainees are subjected to
overcrowding, verbal and physical abuse, and lack "adequate telephone
access, visitation hours, ventilation, food, clean quarters, and functioning
showers and toilets."165 Moreover, substandard health care has been a
particularly severe problem, as over 100 detainees have died in immigra-
tion custody since 2003 due to medical neglect.166 For instance, Victoria
Arellano died from complications arising from AIDS while in immigra-
tion custody because ICE officials refused to provide her appropriate
medication and treatment.167
Second, non-citizens are often transferred to isolated locations, making
it difficult for family members and friends to visit.168 This isolation in-
duces many detainees to concede removability, even when they have
valid claims to immigration relief.169 In addition, being transferred to iso-
lated locations makes retaining and meeting with legal counsel a chal-
lenge,70 which makes it more difficult for detainees to build an effective
defense against removal.'7 ' Third, because detainees cannot earn an in-
come, they cannot provide for their families, which serves to increase
161. Boswell, supra note 10.
162. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 236 (1896).
163. Kalhan, supra note 7, at 43.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 47; see also Mariela Olivares, Intersectionality at the Intersection of Profi-
teering & Immigration Detention, 94 NEB. L. REV. 963, 983 (2016) (describing the "inade-
quate and sometimes dangerous" conditions of detention center facilities).
166. Kalhan, supra note 7, at 47.
167. Kelsey E. Papst, Comment, Protecting the Voiceless: Ensuring ICE's Compliance
with Standards that Protect Immigration Detainees, 40 McGEORGE L. REV. 261, 262 (2009).
168. Kalhan, supra note 7, at 46-47.
169. Id.
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poverty among their families.17 2 Consequently, the families of detainees
are either forced to seek government assistance or drop out of school and
work to replace the lost source of income.17 3 The hardships endured by
non-citizens under mandatory detention are plainly disproportionate,
prejudicial, and otherwise unacceptably punish non-citizens as subclass
members of society.'7 4
B. Why Section 236(c) is Bad Public Policy
Not only does section 236(c) unconstitutionally deprive non-citizens of
their rights, it is also bad public policy. Despite section 236(c)'s supposed
intent to protect communities from dangerous non-citizens,7 s mandatory
detention adversely affects non-citizens who commit minor, non-violent
crimes that pose no danger to communities.7 6 In fact, several studies
suggest immigrants are less likely to commit serious crimes than native
born citizens, and establish a positive link between high concentrations of
immigrants and lower rates of crimes.' Yet, the negative stigma and
stereotypes about immigrants persist and frequently shape immigration
policy in a manner that preemptively labels all immigrants as criminals
and threats to society.178
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See id. at 46-47 ("The result for many noncitizens is a pattern of excessiveness
that spans the entire detention process-from who is being detained in the first place and
on what basis, to the severity of confinement, to the ultimate effect on removal
proceedings.").
175. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 518 (2003).
176. See Shirin Sinnar, Note, Patriotic or Unconstitutional? The Mandatory Detention
of Aliens Under the USA Patriot Act, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1419, 1426 (2003) (discussing how a
non-citizen may be mandatorily detained merely because he or she made a charitable
contribution).
177. Rafael Bernal, Reports Find That Immigrants Commit Less Crime Than US-Born
Citizens, HILL (Mar. 19, 2017), http://thehill.com/latino/324607-reports-find-that-immi-
grants-commit-less-crime-than-us-born-citizens [https://perma.cc/3PA6-44A3]; WALTER A.
EWING ET AL., THE CRIMINALIZATION OF IMMIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 4-5, AM.
IMMIGR. COUNCIL (2015), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/
research/the criminalization of immigration-in the united states.pdf [https://perma.cc/
UL3E-SAJZ]; NAZGOL GHANDNOOSH & JOSH ROVNER, IMMIGR. AND PUB. SAFETY 6-7,
SENTENCING PROJECT (2017), http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/
03/Immigration-and-Public-Safety.pdf [https://perma.cc/VW3K-22XG]; MICHELANGELO
LANDGRAVE & ALEX NOWRASTEH, CRIMINAL IMMIGRANTS: THEIR NUMBERS, DEMO-
GRAPHICS, AND COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN 3-4, CATO INST. (2017), https://object.cato.org/
sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/immigration-brief-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/BM3G-XBRW].
178. See EWING ET AL., supra note 177, at 14 (stating foreigners were defined as po-
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i. Section 236(c) Benefits Corporate Interests at the Cost of the
American Taxpayers
It is important to ask whether section 236(c) truly deters crime or sim-
ply serves as a detriment to American taxpayers.17 9 Funding the over 500
immigrant detention facilities currently in existence costs American tax-
payers, nearly $2 billion dollars a year.1 so Despite the enormous costs
involved, immigration detention facilities are a growing part of the "im-
migration detention industrial complex.""' For example, two private
prison contractors, GEO Group and Corrections Corporations of
America (CCA), have spent an estimated $45 million dollars lobbying
and making campaign contributions to politicians since 2005.182 Unsur-
prisingly, the GEO Group and CCA have doubled their profits since
2005, and the two companies have since funneled even more money into
lobbying efforts and campaign contributions.83
Over time, the GEO Group and CCA have increased their political
influence and maintained large populations of detainees in their prisons
and detention centers, thereby increasing their profit margins.
1 84 The
GEO Group and CCA have allegedly even had a direct role in drafting or
179. See Kalhan, supra note 7, at 57-58 (2010) (describing the projected increase in
detention of non-citizens and associated cost implications).
180. Id. at 46; see e.g., Papazoglou v. Napolitano, No. 1:12-CV-00892, 2012 WL
1570778, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (demonstrating how a mandatorily detained non-citizen was
eligible for relief from removal); Jazmine Ulloa, California Lawmakers Want to Provide
Attorneys to Immigrants Facing Deportation. But Who Gets the Help?, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 2,
2017, 12:05 AM), http://www.1atimes.com/politics/la-pol-sac-california-legal-immigrant-de-
fense-20170302-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/2VSP-VRUC] (claiming many detained
immigrants would be granted relief if they had access to resources such as an immigration
attorney).
181. See Robert Koulish, Blackwater and the Privatization of Immigration Control, 20
ST. THOMAs L. REV. 462, 476-79 (2008) (discussing the privatization of immigrant deten-
tion); see also Olivares, supra note 165, at 982-93 (explaining how private prison compa-
nies profit from immigrant detention facilities); Philip L. Torrey, Rethinking Immigration's
Mandatory Detention Regime: Politics, Profit, and the Meaning of "Custody", 48 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 879, 896 (2015) ("The private prison industry has benefited significantly from
the implementation of the mandatory detention statute, which significantly increased de-
tention numbers."); Bessie Mufloz, Comment, Immigrants for Sale: Corporate America
Puts a Price Tag on Sexual Abuse, 17 SCHOLAR 553, 558-60 (2015) (analyzing how the
private prison industry benefits from anti-immigration laws that lead to the detention of
non-citizens).
182. Mufioz, supra note 181, at 560.
183. See id. (discussing how CCA participated in the passage of Arizona Senate Bill
1070 by making campaign contributions to its primary sponsor, Senator Pearce).
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otherwise contributing to detention enforcement legislation.' For ex-
ample, evidence suggests CCA helped draft and pass Arizona's Senate
Bill 1070 (SB 1070)18 6-a bill permitting local law enforcement to arrest
anyone who appeared to be an undocumented immigrant.'8
That private companies actively lobby members of Congress to in-
crease the size of the detained population should raise red flags, espe-
cially because Congress uses its plenary power to create immigration
laws."'8 American taxpayer's money continues to fund private immigra-
tion prisons and fuels corporate profits under the notion that those de-
tained pose a risk to the community.189 This helps explain the lucrative
opportunities the GEO Group and CCA take advantage of within the
immigration detention industrial complex.'90
Corporations like the GRO Group and CCA secure huge profits by
forcing their agenda through legislation, expanding the criminal acts that
trigger mandatory detention, and sponsoring laws that prioritize arrest,
prosecution, and lengthy immigration detention.'9' In 2013, the federal
government announced an ambitious immigration detention reform
aimed at improving centralized management and the use of a "scoring
system" to reduce the over-detention trends.19 2 Nevertheless, critics re-
main skeptical due to the glacial pace of progress and ICE's arbitrary
185. Id.; see also Melanie Diaz & Timothy Keen, How US Private Prisons Profit from
Immigrant Detention, COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS (May 12, 2015), http://www
.coha.org/how-us-private-prisons-profit-from-immigrant-detention [https://perma.cc/
AM3A-8ZAJ] (stating the Arizona state legislature and CCA representatives ecretly met
to draft a bill that would keep immigrant incarcerate rates prisons up).
186. Mufioz, supra note 181, at, 560; Diaz & Keen, supra note 185.
187. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012) (upholding SB 1070 section 2(B),
which requires officers "to make a reasonable attempt ... to determine the immigration
status of any person they stop, detain, or arrest" if reasonable suspicion exists that person
is unlawfully present in the United States) (internal quotations omitted). SB 1070 also
requires law officials to determine the immigration status of anyone arrested before being
released. Id.
188. See Torrey, supra note 181, at 561 (demonstrating that due process and equal
protection rights may be violated when private companies continuously lobby members of
Congress and take part in drafting legislation). See generally Boswell, supra note 10 (dis-
cussing the plenary power doctrine).
189. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 518 (2003) (emphasizing how Congress
adopted mandatory detention under section 236 to deal with "a backdrop of wholesale
failure by the INS to deal with increasing rates of criminal activity" by non-citizens).
190. See Olivares, supra note 165, at 984 (proclaiming the GEO Group and CCA had
combined revenues of $3 billion in 2011).
191. Id.
192. See generally Mark Noferi & Robert Koulish, The Immigration Detention Risk
Assessment, 29 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 45, 48 (2014) (describing ICE's efforts at addressing
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"Risk Classification Assessment" (RCA) scoring system.'93 Critics' pri-
mary concern is that the scoring tool selectively factors in predominantly
negative information while excluding positive factors that could poten-
tially alter the public safety assessment used to determine whether a non-
citizen should be released and under what conditions.19 4
Because mandatory detention fails to reach its intended goals, it is
clear that section 236(c) is bad public policy. First, it unfairly targets non-
citizens who commit non-violent or petty crimes who pose no danger to
community.19 5 Second, section 236(c) is a detriment to American taxpay-
ers who are forced to pay for a broken immigration detention system
aimed at benefitting corporations.19 6 As such, the status quo must
change if we are to modernize and correct the unjust paradigm of section
236(c), which operates and punishes non-citizens at the cost of American
taxpayer's money.
V. JENNINGs v. RODRIGUEZ AND PROACTIVE SOLUTIONS
To BRING SECTION 236(c) UP TO CURRENT
CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS
The unconstitutionality and flawed public policy reasoning behind sec-
tion 236(c) should be addressed to benefit non-citizens and U.S. citizens
alike. As previously discussed, Rodriguez requires the government to
provide periodic bond hearings every six months so non-citizens can chal-
lenge detention.1 97 To deny bond, immigration officials must prove a
non-citizen is either a danger to the community or considered a flight
risk, but such justification for prolonged detention is insufficient to pro-
tect the constitutional rights of non-citizens.198 Now that the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to the government in Rodriguez (restyled as Jen-
nings v. Rodriguez), the Court should uphold the Ninth Circuit's ruling
and require the government to provide detained individuals with auto-
matic bond hearings after six months of detention across the country.
193. Id. at 67.
194. Id. at 67-69. Noferi and Koulish also point out that criminal researchers have
described dynamic constructs such as the RCA system to be unpredictable; a condition that
is supported by the lack of clarity and understanding regarding the methodology the RCA
uses to make certain recommendations. Id. at 68-69.
195. See Sinnar, supra note 176 (discussing how a non-citizen, who poses no danger to
the community, may be mandatorily detained merely because he or she "donat[ed] to an
undersigned organization intended for charitable purposes"). See generally Medina, supra
note 2 (objecting to the manner in which section 236(c) punishes non-citizens).
196. See supra Part IV(B)(i).
197. Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1089 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom.
Jennings v. Rodriguez, No. 15-1204, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (U.S. June 20, 2016) (mem.).
198. Id. at 1061.
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A. Additional Safeguards: A Logical Extension for Constitutional
Protection of Non-citizens
An additional safeguard arising from Rodriguez is to implement legal
counsel appointment for indigent non-citizens facing mandatory deten-
tion across the board. This critical safeguard is necessary for non-citizens
facing mandatory detention that may last longer than six months.19 9 Not
only do immigration courts not consider immigration removal or deten-
tion as punishment,20 0 they see deportation hearings as civil matters that
do not require the same constitutional protections guaranteed in criminal
proceedings.2 0 1 This lack of constitutional protection is particularly
troubling considering immigration detainees are treated almost identi-
cally like imprisoned criminals.2 0 2 Non-citizens in removal proceedings
may have the right to counsel, but only if they can afford it; in other
words, t non-citizens in removal proceedings are not entitled to appointed
counsel.2 0 3 Further, while non-citizens who cannot afford to pay for
counsel may be informed of free legal services, voluntary counsel may be
difficult to find, particularly in the isolated locations to which many non-
citizens have been transferred.2 0 4 For these reasons, many non-citizens
appear before an immigration court without legal representation,2 0 5 and
are therefore unable to articulate their position before an IJ-much less
mount an effective legal defense to end their mandatory detention.20 6
199. See Kalhan, supra note 7, at 53 (stating the Supreme Court has determined that
serious due process concerns arise when, absent special circumstances, a non-citizen is de-
tained longer than six months).
200. Peter Markowitz, Straddling the Civil-Criminal Divide: A Bifurcated Approach to
Understanding the Nature of Immigration Removal Proceedings, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 289, 289 (2008); see also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 709 (1893)
(pointing out that deportation is not a punishment).
201. See Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 441 (2011) (questioning whether indigent
immigrants should be afforded court-appointed counsel); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678,
690 (2001) ("The proceedings at issue here are civil, not criminal, and we assume that they
are nonpunitive in purpose and effect."); THE BORDERS OF PUNISHMENT: MIGRATION, CIT-
IZENSHIP, AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 63 (Mary Bosworth & Katja Franko Aas eds., 2013)
("[L]ess robust due process protection and subconstitutional rules govern deportation pro-
ceedings, setting few limits on the severity of removal from the country").
202. Kalhan, supra note 7, at 47; Olivares, supra note 165.
203. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2006) ("[T]he alien shall have the privilege of
being represented, at no expense to the Government . . . .") (emphasis added).
204. Anna Paden Carson, Justice for Noncitizens: A Case for Reforming the Immigra-
tion Legal System, 5 VA ENGAGE J., Art. 4, March 2017, at 7-8, http://scholarship.rich
mond.edu/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article=1047&context=vaej [https://perma.cc/7HLK-
K7UM]; cf Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565, 573 (6th Cir. 1975) (DeMascio, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that a non-citizen should be provided a lawyer at government expense
when facing deportation proceedings).
205. Carson, supra note 204, at 7.
206. Kalhan, supra note 7, at 46.
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Collectively, these hardships virtually guarantee a non-citizen without
counsel will be subjected to mandatory detention indefinitely.2 07 Such a
flagrant violation of a non-citizen's due process rights, which should be
rectified by requiring the appointment of legal counsel at the govern-
ment's expense when they face mandatory detention under section
236(c).20 8
Rodriguez reasoned that automatic bond hearings should be afforded
to detained non-citizens because many "typically have no choice but to
proceed pro se, have limited access to legal resources, often lack English-
language proficiency, and are sometimes illiterate." 20 9 Words cannot de-
scribe the severity of prolonged detention for non-citizens: prolonged de-
tention deprives them of their liberty, their ability to support their
families financially, and their ability to attend school or maintain relation-
ships.210 The resultant financial, emotional, and psychological harm is
not limited to detainees, but also affects their families-many of whom
may be LPRs and U.S. citizens.21 1
The appointment of legal counsel for non-citizens detained under sec-
tion 236(c) is a logical extension of the Rodriguez holding and is neces-
sary to address the constitutional issues with mandatory detention. In
Padilla v. Kentucky,2 12 the Supreme Court declared that deportation is a
penalty "intimately related to the criminal process" even though it is in
theory distinguishable from criminal punishment.21 3 However, prolonged
detention of non-citizens is so substantially similar to criminal incarcera-
tion that courts should extend the same constitutional protections en-
joyed by citizens undergoing the latter to non-citizens. The U.S.
Constitution makes few distinctions between non-citizens and citizens.21 4
Rather, the Constitution refers to "persons" and the "the people" when
207. See id. (asserting that detainees who have limited access to counsel face barriers
which prevent them from presenting "effective defenses against removal").
208. Aguilera-Enriquez, 516 F.2d at 573.
209. Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1085 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom.
Jennings v. Rodriguez, No. 15-1204, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (U.S. June 20, 2016) (mem.).
210. Kalhan, supra note 7, at 46.
211. Id. at 46.
212. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
213. Id. at 365.
214. For example, the Fourteenth Amendment states: "[N]or shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV § 1 (em-
phasis added); see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) ("The Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to the protection of citizens."); Carson,
supra note 204, at 14 (discussing how the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution
identifies "persons" and "citizens").
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describing to whom it extends its protections.2 1 5 Therefore, non-citizens
should receive the same constitutional protections and safeguards as any
citizen detained for prolonged periods of time.2 16 Clearly, citizens enjoy
rights that non-citizens do not, such as voting and holding political of-
fice,2 17 but the laws must be applied in a fair and just manner to all per-
sons. Indeed, The Court concluded that all persons within U.S. territory
are entitled to protections of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments.2 18 As such, there is no reason why due
process protections against the government's deprivations of a person's
life, liberty, or property should not apply to non-citizens facing
mandatory detention.2 19 Diminishing constitutional protections based on
citizenship is problematic because treating groups of people differently
dilutes the fundamental rights guaranteed to "the people" protected
under the Constitution.
At the very least, courts should acknowledge that LPRs deserve the
constitutional protection of due process, and Congress should not disre-
gard an LPR's rights by exercising its plenary power without considera-
tion thereof.220  Moreover, LPRs should be appointed legal
representation when facing mandatory detention. The Constitution
should ensure that LPRs, who have strong family relationships, lengthy
physical presence in and economic ties to the United States are entitled
to a heightened standard of protection under the Due Process Clause.
Congress should also create alternatives to mandatory detention to en-
sure section 236(c) does not overreach constitutional safeguards.
B. Alternatives to Mandatory Detention
Section 236(c) does not respect constitutional restraints and violates
the protections of the Due Process Clause.22 ' Consequently, it is essen-
tial to set forth new alternatives to detention, such as implementing su-
215. E.g., Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 369. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall
make no law .. . abridging the. . . right of the people peaceably to assemble. ."), with U.S.
CONsT. amend. XIV § 1 ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty without due process of law . . .") (emphases added).
216. Carson, supra note 204, at 22-24.
217. Id. at 14. Voting and holding political office are the only rights enjoyed by citi-
zens, but not by non-citizens. Id.
218. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896).
219. U.S. CONsT. amend. V. See generally Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 238 ("[E]ven [non-
citizens] shall not be held to answer for a capital or other infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a grand jury, nor be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law.").
220. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 162 (1945) (Murphy, J., concurring).
221. Cf Henkin, supra note 1 (arguing the power of Congress to control immigration
is subject to constitutional restraint).
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pervisory programs that would enable the release of detained non-
citizens: for example, requiring periodic reporting in person, reporting
over the phone, or GPS monitoring.2 2 2 Such alternatives will ensure non-
citizens appear at their immigration proceeding and abide by the IJ's final
ruling-not to mention they are more humane and afford non-citizens an
opportunity to prepare their case without the need for physical
detention.2 23
Not only are these solutions more rational and in line with the spirit of
the Constitution, they also make economic sense. For instance, DHS de-
tains an estimated 400,000 people per year, and ICE detains an estimated
34,000 a day.2 24 Further, detaining a single individual costs roughly $166
per day.2 25 Combined, detaining so many people costs taxpayers about
$5,644,000 a day.22 6 On the other hand, implementing more humane su-
pervisory alternatives to mandatory detention can reduce the daily cost
from $166 to $0.70 a day per non-citizen-an astronomical savings for
227U.S. taxpayers.
The Supreme Court is in a unique position to address these alternatives
in analyzing Jennings v. Rodriguez. Alternatively, Congress should im-
plement these solutions to set out a more civilized approach while simul-
taneously saving taxpayer money. Of course, these alternatives should
only be available to non-citizens without convictions for violent offenses.
Even then, 89% of detained non-citizens would still have access to them,
saving tax payers billions of dollars.2 28
VI. CONCLUSION
From its inception, section 236(c) has punished non-citizens in a dis-
criminatory fashion by depriving them of the protections guaranteed to
"all persons" by the U.S. Constitution. Contrary to the rhetoric advanced
by advocates of section 236(c), the broken legislation does not advance
any of its intended objectives. Rather, it violates the constitutional rights
222. Kalhan, supra note 7, at 54-55.
223. Torrey, supra note 181, at 883.
224. Immigration Detention: How Can the Government Cut Costs?, Hum. RTS. FIRST,
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/uploads/pdfs/immigration-detention-fact-sheet-jan-2013
.pdf [https://perma.cc/J7QC-W9GL] (last visited Apr. 14, 2017) [hereinafter HUM. RTS.
FIRST]; Immigration Detention 101, DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, https://www.deten-
tionwatchnetwork.org/issues/detention-101 [https://perma.cc/68YF-7QDP] (last visited
Apr. 14, 2017).
225. Torrey, supra note 181, at 882.
226. Hum. RTs. FIRST, supra note 224.
227. Torrey, supra note 181, at 882.
228. See id. (stating DHS admitted that of the 30,000 people it was detaining at a
certain date in 2009, only 11% had previously been convicted of a violent offense).
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of non-citizens under the veil of Congress's plenary power, which that
largely insulates section 236(c) from constitutional attack. Despite the
clear due process violations arising from mandatory detention, section
236(c) endures due to the limited oversight of immigration agencies oper-
ating under powers delegated by Congress.
Although some courts ruled against section 236(c), the decisions do not
go far enough to redress the unconstitutionality of mandatory detention.
Courts have also failed to establish the necessary safeguards to protect
non-citizens' rights. It is imperative that courts consider the hardships of
"civil detention" and critically evaluate the misguided public policy and
corporate interests behind section 236(c). Only by weighing these sub-
stantial interests will the Supreme Court remedy the broken immigration
system that incarcerates non-citizens at the expense of U.S. taxpayers.
Our country cannot afford to turn a blind eye to the unnecessary and
unacceptable overuse of mandatory detention under section 236(c). Un-
doubtedly, there are violent, criminal non-citizens who deserve to be de-
tained under section 236(c), but this minority does not justify the broad
misapplication of mandatory detention as currently applied to all non-
citizens. In considering Jennings v. Rodriguez, the Supreme Court should
address pragmatic alternatives to mandatory detention, such as the ap-
pointment of legal counsel and alternatives to detention, when feasible.
This proactive approach will ensure that immigration agencies are held
accountable and non-citizens are not deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law.
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